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LANDLORD AND TENANT-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY - DEMISE OF THE TRADITIONAL
DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
INTRODUCTION
The common law doctrine of caveat emptor is based on the theory that
the vendor-lessor and the vendee-lessee deal at arm's length, and that the
vendee-lessee possesses both the means and the opportunity to gain infor-
mation concerning the real property involved in the transaction.1 Com-
mon sense, say the proponents of caveat emptor, dictates that the vendee-
lessee has the responsibility to lookout for himself; if he did not ascertain
that the real property he was about to purchase or lease was not what he
hoped it would be, and if he did not protect his own interests by obtaining
an express warranty from the vendor-lessor, the law is under no duty to
rescue him from his folly. Lord Coke, in drawing a comparison between
the civil law2 view of the problem and that of the common law stated:
Note that by the Civil Law every man is bound to warrent the thing he selleth or
conveyth, albeit there be no express warrenty, but the Common Law bideth him not,
unlesse therebe a warrenty, either in Deed or in Law for Caveat Emptor. .... .
The doctrine has remained practically unchanged since Lord Coke's pro-
nouncement,4 despite criticism by such renowned legal scholars as Justice
Cardozo.5
1. See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133
(1931).
2. In civil law countries, a doctrine which is the antipode of caveat emptor
exists. Under the civil law the seller is the one who must beware, since a sound
price implies a sound commodity. See Comment, Builder-Vendor's Implied War-
ranty of Good Workmanship and Habitability, 1 TExAs TECH. L. REV. 111 (1969).
3. COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE 102 (3rd ed. 1633).
4. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961).
5. Justice Cardozo stated: "In one field or another of activity, practices in
opposition to the sentiments and standards of the age may grow up and threaten to
entrench themselves if not dislodged. Despite their temporary hold, they do not
stand comparison with accepted norms of morals. Indolence or passivity has tol-
erated what the considerate judgment of the community condemns. In such cases,
one of the highest functions of the judge is to establish the true relation between
conduct and profession. There are even times, to speak somewhat paradoxically,
when nothing less than a subjective measure will satisfy objective standards. Some
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The American Courts were quick to adopt the doctrine of caveat emptor
once independence was won.6 As early as 1836 Justice Story said that in
spite of all the arguments raised against the application of caveat emptor it
"is now too firmly established to be open to legal controversy. ' '7 In Bar-
nard v. Kellogg s Justice Davis, speaking for the Supreme Court, declared
that with a single exception," "the courts of all the States in the Union
where the common law prevails, . . . sanction it."' 0 The doctrine is still
the prevailing rule in American jurisdictions."
A significant trend against the continued applicability of the doctrine of
caveat emptor is developing in situations dealing with the sale 12 and leas-
ing"1 of real property. The most effective attack upon caveat emptor is be-
ing waged by the application of an implied warranty theory. This warranty
promises that the premises in question are habitable or fit for the purpose
for which they were bought or leased. The purpose of this comment is to
examine the case law supporting this attack on caveat emptor and the ra-
tionale behind it.
relations in life impose a duty to act in accordance with the customary morality and
nothing more. In those the customary morality must be the standard for the
judge. Caveat emptor is a maxim that will often have to be followed then the
morality which it expresses is not that of sensitive souls. . . . But I am ready to
concede that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be aban-
doned, ought to be in some degree relaxed. I think that when a rule, after it has
been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of
justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal
and full abandonment. . . . Perhaps we should do so oftener in fields of private
law where considerations of social utility are not so aggressive and insistent. There
should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be
discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the
litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product of institutions or
conditions which have gained a new significance or development with the progress
of the year." CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 108, 150 (1921).
6. See Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend. 449 (N.Y. 1837); Sweet v. Eilgage, 20 Johns.
190 (N.Y. 1822); Seixas and Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. 1804).
7. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUIrY JURISPRUDENCE 221 (1st ed. 1836).
8. 77 U.S. 383 (1870).
9. The lone exception was South Carolina.
10. Supra note 8, at 388-89.
11. See Valen v. Jewell, 88 Conn. 151, 90 A. 36 (1914); Luedtke v. Phillips,
190 Va. 207, 56 S.E.2d 80 (1949); Stewart v. Raleigh County Bank, 121 W. Va.
181, 2 S.E.2d 274 (1939).
12. See Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942); Carpenter v.
Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274,
387 P.2d 260 (1963).
13. See generally Note, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Trans-
actions, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L REV. 127 (1968).
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THE IMPLIED WARRANTY THEORY AS APPLIED
TO THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
Legal scholars today are enthusiastically congraulating themselves on
the enactment of statutes, such as the Uniform Commerical Code, which
impose upon the seller of chattels a promise that his merchandise is rea-
sonably fit for the purpose for which it is sold. In the midst of all this en-
thusiam they seem to have forgotten about the purchaser of real property
who has no such protection.
A man can go into his corner drugstore and purchase a thirty-nine cent
pen, take the pen home and discover that it is defective; subsequent to this
discovery he can return to the store and have his money refunded. 14 The
purchaser of the thirty-nine cent pen has the protection of the warranty of
merchantable quality, which is implied in every sale by a merchant. 15
That same man can withdraw his life savings from his bank and purchase
a new home amid several hundred houses that a developer has built in a
new subdivision. The purchase of the house entails a great deal of paper-
work, since the purchase of the house, in most instances, includes the par-
cel of land upon which it is situated. Legally, the transaction is seen as the
purchase and sale of the land upon which the house rests. Hence the trans-
action will culminate when the developer delivers the deed to the buyer.
A year or so after the purchase, the roof caves in and the walls collapse.
What remedy can the buyer rely on? If the doctrine of caveat emptor is
strictly applied, none, for the buyer, according to the doctrine, deserves
whatever he gets. After all, he had an opportunity to inspect the premises,
and if his inspection was not thorough enough to discover some structural
defect, why punish the seller! In any event, the argument runs, the pur-
chaser could always have acquired an express warranty from the innocent
seller.
What accounts for the difference in legal protection provided the pur-
chaser of real property? A possible answer is that the doctrine of caveat
emptor as applied to the sale of real property is an example of the continu-
ing application of nineteenth-century law to a twentieth-century situation.
Caveat emptor did not have the same adverse effect on the nineteenth-
century home buyer. The typical home buyer would purchase his own
14. Official Text with Comments, U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 714, 715.
15. Official Text with Comments, U.C.C. § 2-315, which states: "Where the
seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill orjudgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such pur-
pose." For a discussion of the application of the U.C.C. to real property, see
Kratovil, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Real Property Lawyer, 18 DEPAUL
L. REv. 101 (1968).
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plot of land and then would retain an architect to design his home. Once
the plans were drawn the buyer would then hire an independent contractor
who would build the home according to the architect's plans. A unique
type of "quality control" was developed, for the contractor was not paid a
lump sum, but was paid in installments. As the contractor completed each
part of the house, to the satisfaction of the architect who drew the plans, he
was paid for that portion. 0 Hence, if the roof did cave in or the walls col-
lapsed, the typical nineteenth-century buyer was fortunate enough to have
a choice of remedies. The buyer could bring an action against the architect
for negligence if the plans were poorly drawn or he could bring an action
against the contractor if the construction work was poorly done.
It is important to note that the protection given the nineteenth-century
buyer was brought about because the buyer had had the home constructed
on property which he had owned prior to the time of construction. If our
nineteenth-century buyer had purchased a new home which was built up-
on the vendor's land the doctrine of caveat emptor would apply and he
would not be protected.
At the end of World War II houses were in great demand, and due to the
heavy machinery developed and the prefabricated houses being put up al-
most overnight, they were produced in astounding quantities. 17 The vast
majority of these were erected by builder-vendors. The "quality controls"
available to the nineteenth-century were not available to these buyers.
Due to the ever rising demand for new homes, the hurried construction and
skimping on materials, an ever-increasing number of instances of poor qual-
ity resulted. When these buyers turned to the courts for relief, they found
recovery blocked by the ancient maxim of caveat emptor. The building
boom has continued to the present and buyers, when attempting to recover
for defects in their new homes, must be prepared to combat the doctrine of
caveat emptor in order to be successful.
England, despite her tradition of strict adherence to stare decisis, pro-
vided the impetus toward a decline in the application of caveat emptor to
the sale of real property. The initial assault on the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor came in the relatively obscure case of Duncan v. Blundell.'8  Plaintiff
16. See Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORN. L.Q. 835 (1967).
17. The value of annual new construction of private residential building in-
creased from less than $2,000,000,000 annually in 1945 to about $15,000,000,000
annually by September 1959. At the same time, the number of one family non-
farm dwelling units began in each year increased from about 10,000 units began in
1945 to about 1,150,000 units began in 1950. See FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
CHART BOOK ON FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS STATISTICS (Historical Supp. 1959).
18. 171 Eng. Rep. 749 (N.P. 1820); see also The Moorcock [1889] 14 P.D. 64.
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brought an action to recover wages to which he alleged he was entitled for
installing a stove in defendant's shop. In defense of this allegation it was
asserted that plaintiff had failed to follow defendant's instructions as to the
stove's construction. After hearing the evidence as presented Justice Bay-
ley found that plaintiff did not in fact follow the defendant's instructions
and hence plaintiff, in his opinion, was not entitled to recovery. 19 The ef-
fect of Justice Bayley's ruling was the establishment of an implied term in
construction contracts that the job would be done in a workmanlike man-
ner with proper materials. This case paved the way for the courts to es-
tablish exceptions to strict adherence to caveat emptor.
An early exception to the general rule of caveat emptor, as applied to
the sale of real property, was formulated in the English case of Miller v.
Cannon Hill Estates Ltd.20  The plaintiff contracted to purchase from the
defendant a house that was still under construction at the time of sale. Up-
on completion the plaintiff moved in, only to find out a short time later that
he was compelled to vacate the house because dampness in the house had
a detrimental effect on his health. Although the court found an express
warranty under which it held the vendor liable, it went on to say, by way of
dictum, that when an uncompleted house is purchased, an implied war-
ranty exists that it prove to be habitable. The court reasoned that this
warranty was necessary because the property was bought to be lived in
and sufficient opportunity to properly inspect the structure had not been
given to the purchaser. 21
In Perry v. Sharon Development Co.22 the court indicated an additional
reason for rejecting caveat emptor with respect to the sale of an uncom-
pleted house while continuing to apply caveat emptor to the sale of a com-
pleted house, the court stated:
[F]rom the point of the view of the vendor, the contract is not merely a contract
to sell, but also a contract to do building work, and insofar as it is a contract to do
building work, it is only natural and proper that . . . [the work] . . . should be
done properly. 23
Hence, the court draws a distinction between the house as an entity and the
work put into constructing that house. The warranty does not guarantee
a house free from defects, but rather warrants that the construction of the
As to implied stipulations as to workmanship and materials in a building contract
see 3 HALSBuRY's LAWS 435 para. 818 (3rd ed. 1935).
19. Duncan v. Bludell, supra note 18, at 749.
20. [19311 1 All E.R. 93 (K.B.).
21. Id. at 96.
22. [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.).
23. Id. at 396.
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house be done in a workmanlike manner. If the vendee contracts for the
construction of a house, and that construction is not done in a workmanlike
manner, he may sue for breach of the warranty. This distinction allows the
courts to refuse to apply the warranty in a situation where a completed
house is purchased. The courts reason that since the house is completed
at the time of purchase no warranty as to construction of the house can exist.
In Jennings v. Tavener,2 4 the plaintiff agreed to buy a bungalow from
the defendant, who was building it without assistance of an architect, but
according to plans originally prepared by an architect. A short time after
plaintiff occupied the premises cracks appeared in the walls. A determina-
tion was made that the cracks were caused by the withdrawal of moisture
from the clay soil of the site by the roots of some poplar trees thirty to forty
feet from the back of the bungalow. This type of desiccation by such roots
was a well-recognized danger in the construction industry. The basis of
plaintiff's cause of action sounded in breach of contract, in that he alleged
that the bungalow was unfit for habitation.
The court, in finding for plaintiff, reasoned that in a contract for the sale
of a house in the course of construction an implied warranty exists that the
house when completed will be fit for human habitation.2 5  The danger
presented by the tree roots was well-known to those in the construction
business. Hence, the vendor's failure to take it into consideration rendered
his construction of the house of less than a workmanlike quality. Once the
court was able to establish that the house was not constructed in a work-
manlike manner, it was possible for the court to conclude that the house
was not fit for human habitation. The defendant argued that even if the
warranty existed it would not apply to those portions of the house below
the ground. The court dismissed this argument stating that the fact that
the damage was to the foundation of the house is of no significance, for
the warranty applied to portions of the house below as well as above the
ground. 20 Certainly a defective foundation would be as detrimental to
habitation as would cracks in the walls; defendant's argument was tenuous
to say the least.
The English exception to caveat emptor has won acceptance in a number
of jurisdictions in the United States; 27 however, many jurisdictions main-
24. [1955] 2 All E.R. 769 (Q.B.); see also Thompson v. Cremin,, [1953] 2 All
E.R. 1185; Re Puckett & Smith's Contract, [1902] 2 Ch. 258, 71 L.J. Ch. 666, 87
L.T.R. 189.
25. Jennings v. Tavener, supra note 24, at 774.
26. Jennings v. Tavener, supra note 24, at 774.
27. See Glisan v. Smolenske, supra note 12; Week v. A.M. Sunrise Const.
Co., 36 Il1. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103
960 [Vol. XX
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tain their allegiance to the traditional view of the all-encompassing appli-
cability of caveat emptor.28 The exception's initial recognition in the
United States came in the case of Vanderschrier v. Aaron.29 A defective
sewer line caused flooding in the cellar of plaintiff's house, which had been
purchased prior to completion. The court, in awarding damages against
the builder-vendor, admitted that "[i]n this country, we have found but
few cases bearing upon the question . . . [and] have found none in this
state directly touching it. ' ' 30 Judge Doyle, in fact, admitted that his deci-
sion was based on the English case of Perry v. Sharon Development Co.,
Ltd.3 1 In support of his decision he stated:
In the law of England, we find the rule to be that, upon the sale of a house in the
course of erection, there is an implied warranty that the house will be finished in a
workmanlike manner. 32
Thus, not only was the English exception to caveat emptor adopted, but its
adoption was based on English precedent.
One year later Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc.3 3 was decided in Wash-
ington. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the plaintiff, who
contracted to purchase a house which was constructed in accordance with
plans prepared by the developer, was entitled to recover money damages
on account of defective plumbing and the subsequent damages caused by
the discharge of raw sewage on the premises. The court treated the build-
ing aspect of the transaction as a construction contract and found therein
an implied warranty that the finished product would be fit for human habi-
tation.34 This court, as the court in Vandershrier relied on English prec-
edent as the basis of its decision.35
Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla.
1963); Hoye v. Century Builders Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958). For
early American criticism of caveat emptor see Note, 18 MD. L. REV. 332 (1958)
and Comment, 5 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (1956).
28. See Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961);
Allen v. Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P.2d 818 (1951); Walton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App.
753, 131 S.E.2d 655 (1963); Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188
N.E.2d 780 (1963), which distinguished Weck v. A. M. Sunrise Const. Co., supra
note 27; Tudor v. Heugal, 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961); Berger v.
Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92 A.2d 376 (1952); Kerr v. Parsons, 83 Ohio App. 204,
82 N.E.2d 303 (1948); Sticker v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 778 (1959).
29. Supra note 27.
30. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, supra note 27, at 342, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
31. Supra note 22.
32. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, supra note 27, at 341-42, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
33. Supra note 27.
34. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., supra note 27, at 832, 329 P.2d at 477.
35. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., supra note 27, at 834, 329 P.2d at 477.
In the Oklahoma case of Jones v. Gatewood, supra note 27, the purchaser had
1971]
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A complicating factor present in the application of the implied warranty
theory to the sale of real property is that of merger. The doctrine of
merger, as applied to real property law, considers the deed as the critical
point in a conveyance. Under the doctrine of merger the agreement for
purchase of the home and the sale of land become merged into the deed,
and hence the deed is held to contain all the rights of the parties."' There-
fore, the execution and delivery of the deed eliminate elements not ex-
pressly mentioned in the deed, unless fraud or mistake can be proven or un-
less collateral matters are involved.8 7 The deed is regarded as the final ex-
pression and depositary of the agreed terms.38
In Weck v. A. M. Sunrise Construction Co.,89 the purchaser sued the
builder-vendor to collect the cost both of correcting defects in the house
and for the installation of a driveway. At the trial level the purchaser re-
covered, the decision being based on the finding that the house was incom-
plete at the time of purchase and hence the implied warranty of fitness ap-
plied. The appellate court sustained the lower court's application of the
bought a house under construction and upon occupancy discovered that the house
was not waterproof. In a concise opinion the court sustained the plaintiff's cause
based on an implied warranty. The court relied on Vanderschrier, supra note 27,
Hoye, supra note 27, and Miller, supra note 20, as precedent.
36. See United States v. Mojac Const. Corp., 190 F. Supp. 622 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Christensen v. Slawter, 173 Cal. App. 2d 325, 343 P.2d 341 (1st Dist.,
Div. One, 1959); Carey v. Shellburne, Inc., 224 A.2d 400 (Del. 1966); Milu, Inc.
v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1967); Shetzen v. C.G. Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga.
App. 477, 92 S.E.2d 114 (1956); Jolley v. Idaho Securities Inc., 90 Idaho 373,
414 P.2d 879 (1966); Brownell v. Quinn, 47 Ill. App. 2d 206, 197 N.E.2d 721
(1964); Anderson v. King, 250 Iowa 208, 93 N.W.2d 762 (1958); Ballard v. Walsh,
353 Mass. 767, 233 N.E.2d 926 (1968); Bernard v. Schneider, 264 Minn. 104,
117 N.W.2d 755 (1962); Mississippi State Highway Comm. v. Cohn, 217 So. 2d
528 (Miss. 1969); Artman v. O'Brien App., 398 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1965); Schillinger
v. Huber, 133 Mont. 80, 320 P.2d 346 (1958); Hoke v. Welsh, 162 Neb. 831,
77 N.W.2d 659 (1956); Kuzemchak v. Pitchford, 78 N.M. 378, 431 P.2d 756 (1967);
Ferro v. Miller, 246 N.Y.S.2d 149, 41 Misc. 2d 331 (1963); Fuller v. Drenberg, 3
Ohio St. 2d 109, 209 N.E.2d 417 (1965); Watson v. Johnson, 411 P.2d 498 (Okla.
1966); Johnston v. Lindsay, 266 Ore. 243, 292 P.2d 495 (1956); Carsek Corp. v.
Stephen Schiftes Inc., 431 Pa. 550, 246 A.2d 365 (1968); Commercial Bank,
Unincorp. of Mason Tex. v. Satterwhite, 413 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1967); Kelsey v.
Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966); Jones v. National Bank of Com-
merce of Seattle, 66 Wash. 2d 314, 402 P.2d 673 (1965).
37. As to collateral agreements see Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority,
202 Cal. App. 2d 827, 21 Cal. Rptr. 225 (2nd Dist., Div. Four, 1962); Trapp v.
Gordon, 366 Ill. 102, 7 N.E.2d 869 (1937); Stack v. Commercial Towel & Uni-
form Service, 120 Ind. App. 483, 91 N.E.2d 790 (1950); Dunseath v. Hallouer,
41 Wash. 2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953). Where a deed is induced by false repre-
sentations, the representations and the deed are distinct and the representations are
not merged in the deed. Everett v. Gilliband, 47 N.M. 269, 141 P.2d 326 (1943).
38. See Union Producing Co. v. Sanborn, 194 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Tex. 1961).
39. Supra note 27.
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implied warranty. One of the defenses raised by the builder-vendor, as
to the driveway, was that of merger. The court rejected this position rea-
soning that the doctrine of merger was not applicable where the collateral
agreement was not inconsistent with the deed or where it appeared that the
execution of the deed was only a partial execution of the contract.40
A significant blow to the defense of merger in implied warranty cases
was struck in Glisan v. Smolenske.41  As usual, the purchaser agreed to
buy a house in the process of construction, and at the time title passed the
house was incomplete. A short time after the plaintiff occupied the prem-
ises cracks began to appear in the walls. The cause of these cracks was
found to be the builder's failure to remedy the unsatisfactory condition of
the underlying soil. The court held that since the house was incomplete at
the time title passed, an implied warranty of fitness for habitation pro-
tected the purchaser.42
The builder-vendor sought to avoid the application of the warranty by
arguing that even if it did exist at some point in time, it had now been
merged into the deed and therefore had been extinguished. The court la-
belled this argument as "an inversion of the primacy of instruments. '48
The court went on to reason that because the house was not complete at the
time of closing, the deed was not the culmination of the sale, but was
merely one step in the process of providing the purchaser with both pos-
session and title of a finished house. The court concluded its opinion by
40. Supra note 27, at 396, 184 N.E.2d at 734; see also Laurel Realty Co. v.
Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A.2d 23 (1950); Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub,
191 Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354 (1948); City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co., 134 Ore. 119,
289 P. 1044 (1930). In 1963 the court in Courtakon v. Adams, supra note 28,
refused to find an implied warranty where the house, as in Wecks, supra note 27,
was complete when title passed. The court distinguished Wecks on the ground
that it was a construction contract case.
41. Supra note 12, Price v. Woodward-Brown Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 561 (1st
Dep't 1921), aff'd mem., 201 App. Div. 837, 192 N.Y.S. 947 (1st Dep't 1922)
seems to be the predecessor of the approach taken by the Glisan court. In that
case a vendor argeed to convey a parcel of land to the purchaser and to erect on the
land a house according to plans and specifications detailed in the sales contract.
The purchaser accepted the deed before the house was completed. The court ruled
that the purchaser could sue the builder-vendor for damages which resulted from
the builder's failure to follow plans. The court reasoned that since the deed was
accepted prior to completion of the house, it could hardly be the intent of the
parties to regard the delivery of the deed as performance and therefore the doctrine
of merger would not apply. Cf. Disbrow v. Harris, 122 N.Y. 362, 25 N.E. 356
(1890); see Comment, Merger of Land Contract in Deed, 25 ALBANY L. REV. 122
(1961). The role intent plays in the doctrine of merger is discussed in Terry v.
Raif, 205 Misc. 1059, 130 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Broome County, County Ct. 1954).
42. Glisan v. Smolenske, supra note 12, at 280, 387 P.2d at 263.
43. Glisan v. Smolenske, supra note 12, at 280, 387 P.2d at 263.
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stating: "If the terms of a sale and purchase agreement are fulfilled by
the delivery of a deed, there is a merger. . .. -44 However, it is question-
able whether this case can be used as authority for that principle since the
same court in a later case held the warranty applicable to a completed
house.
45
The cases which allowed recovery based on the implied warranty of fit-
ness or habitability, prior to 1964, can be summarized as follows: (1)
all the cases involved a purchaser who either contracted to buy a house not
as yet completed or had purchased a lot and agreed to have a contractor
build the house; (2) the defects were not discovered until the purchaser
occupied the house; (3) the defects complained of rendered the house un-
inhabitable.
The very nature of the distinction between a finished and unfinished
house, drawn by the courts in these cases, gives rise to problems. When,
for example, is the house to be considered completed for the purpose of re-
fusing to invoke the warranty? Nor does the distinction appear to have a
logical basis. Does the purchaser of a completed home have a better oppor-
tunity to inspect the house? The courts themselves seemed so dissatisfied
with this artificial distinction, that dissatisfaction soon ripened into action.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Carpenter v. Donohoe,46 was the
first to recognize the unsoundness of the distinction drawn between com-
pleted and uncompleted homes for purposes of applying an implied war-
ranty of fitness or habitability. Carpenter, the defendant, had built, and
was offering for sale, a completed house. The Donohoes purchased the
house; within four months of the purchase, the walls began to crack. The
condition became progressively worse and in time the habitation of the
house became extremely hazardous. The trial court found that the house
was constructed in violation of county code provisions. 47 The court also
found that the code violations resulted in the damage to the house and that
at the time of sale Carpenter knew of them and the Donohoes did not.48
The court held Carpenter liable, basing its decision on fraud. 49
The Donohoes also had included, in their original complaint, a count
based on implied warranty. 50 The trial court required an election of reme-
44. Glisan v. Smolenske, supra note 12, at 280, 387 P.2d at 263.
45. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12.
46. Supra note 12.
47. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 80, 388 P.2d at 400.
48. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 80, 388 P.2d at 400.
49. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 80, 388 P.2d at 400.
50. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 82, 388 P.2d at 401.
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dies to be made by the Donohoes, and they decided to proceed on the fraud
count.51 The Supreme Court found the imposed choice of remedies im-
proper and held that the implied warranty count should have been con-
sidered.5 2 The court felt this to be an opportune time to levy an attack on
the distinction made in applying the warranty between completed and
uncompleted houses. Justice Frantz, speaking for the court, stated:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near com-
pletion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incongruous.
To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is
recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.53
Reasoning from this premise the court held:
[Tihat the implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements between
builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly constructed buildings, com-
pleted at the time of contracting. There is an implied warranty that builder-
vendors have complied with the building code of the area in which the structure is
located. Where, as here, a home is the subject of sale, there are implied warranties
that the home was built in workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation. 5 4
The Colorado court had thus taken the initial step in the extension of the
implied warranty to the sale of a completed house. The decision must have
shocked the builder-vendor's attorney because of the lack of precedent
available to the Colorado court. 'The court merely cited the cases which
applied the warranty theory to the sale of uncompleted houses and flatly
stated that the warranty also existed when a completed house was pur-
chased. It is important to note that in the factual situation before the court
the violations of the housing code played an important role in the decision.
Would the decision by the Colorado court to extend the warranty to com-
pleted houses have been different if the violations of the housing code were
not present? At any rate it seems questionable that the Colorado case
would become very viable precedent for future decisions because of its lack
of logical reasoning; the decision seemed to be based on name-calling and
little else. Would this decision open the door for other courts who desired
to reach the same result, but did not wish to take the initiative?
The Supreme Court of New Jersey indicated its approval of the deci-
sion in Carpenter in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.5 5 In that case the de-
51. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 82, 388 P.2d at 401.
52. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 82, 388 P.2d at 401.
53. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
54. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra note 12, at 83-84, 388 P.2d at 402.
55. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Much of the groundwork for this
decision was layed in the strong dissent of Justice Waesche in Levy v. C. Young
Const. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957), a/I'd, 26 N.J. 330,
139 A.2d 738 (1958). Justice Waesche stated: "Since the defendant was in the
business of creating houses to sell, it represented that it possessed a reasonable
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fendent builder-vendor contracted with the vendee prior to the completion
of construction of the home. In 1958, the vendee moved into the house
and lived there until the year 1960, at which time the vendee leased the
house to one of the plaintiffs for a period of one year. Two days after the
plaintiff-lessee moved in, his sixteen-month-old son was severely scalded
by hot water from the bathroom faucet. The plaintiff alleged the cause of
injury to have been the faulty design of the hot water system, and in par-
ticular the absence of a mixing valve. The absence of this valve, it was
alleged, resulted in abnormally hot water suddenly flowing from the fau-
cet without notice or warning. One of the counts of plaintiff's complaint
sounded in implied warranty of habitability. The trial court dismissed the
action at the close of plaintiff's case. 56
The Supreme Court reversed. 57 Justice Jacobs, in rejecting defendant's
defense of caveat emptor, stated:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the
judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its common law
principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions which make no sense in to-
day's society and tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected .... 58
Justice Jacobs went on to say:
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised model, ... he
clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its implied representation that the
house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably
fit for habitation. He has no architect or other professional advisor of his own, he
has no real competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in the
nature of things, largely superficial and his opportunity for obtaining meaningful
protective changes in the conveyancing documents prepared by the builder-vendor
is negligible.59
It was the opinion of Justice Jacobs that if injury arises from improper con-
struction the public interest dictates that the cost of the injury be borne by
the builder-vendor. 60 The decision can be said to rest on the "deep pocket"
amount of skill necessary for erection of a house. This representation was im-
pliedly made to whomever purchased from the defendant a house. . . Such a
representation is indispensable to effectuate the sale of a house erected by a de-
veloper for the purpose of selling. Otherwise, there would be no sales. A person
in the business of building houses to sell is fully aware that a purchaser relies
upon such an implied representation. Since the defendant impliedly represented that
it possessed a reasonable amount of skill requisite for the erection of a house, it
follows that it also impliedly represented that the house was erected in a proper and
reasonably workmanlike manner." Id. at 298, 134 A.2d at 720.
56. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55, at 80, 207 A.2d at 316.
57. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55, at 80, 207 A.2d at 314.
58. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55, at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
59. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55, at 91, 207 A.2d at 325-26.
60. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55, at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 326.
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of the builder; in other words, he is thought to be in a better position eco-
nomically to shoulder the loss than the vendee.61 This argument is not
logically sound. Our system of redress for civil wrong is based on causa-
tion and fault; the fact that a builder has a "deep pocket" cannot logically
be considered a basis for holding the builder liable for the plaintiff's injury.
Justice Jacobs' argument as to the lack of opportunity for the vendee to
inspect the premises is much stronger, for, as he indicates, the vendee does
not possess the expertise needed to discover most defects until they mani-
fest themselves by obvious damage. This decision is considered a land-
mark decision because it illustrates the changing attitude of the courts
toward application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of com-
pleted structures.
The Supreme Court of Idaho was next to fall into line. In Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel,62 the plaintiff purchased a home from the builder through a realtor.
A short time after occupation of the premises it was discovered that the
basement was not waterproof and also that an unsealed irrigation ditch ran
under the garage. The plaintiff sued, basing his action on breach of the
implied warranty of habitability. The court, endorsing the position taken by
Justice Jacobs in Schipper, stated:
The old rule of caveat emptor does not satisfy the demands of justice in such
cases. The purchase of a home is not an everyday transaction for the average
family, and in many instances is the most important transaction of a lifetime.63
The court in rejecting the vendor's argument of equality of bargaining po-
sition stated, "[t]o apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced
buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business of
building and selling houses, . . . is manifestly a denial of justice."'6 4
The builder-vendor also attempted to argue that the implied warranty
would place an unreasonable burden upon him, that is, the obligation to
deliver a perfect house. Obviously no house is built without defects; how-
ever, minor defects must be distinguished from those which render the
house unfit for habitation. It is the later situation in which the warranty is
applied. The interests of the builder-vendor are protected by the rule that
places the burden on the purchaser to establish the facts which give rise to
the implied warranty and its breach.
61. In the words of Justice Jacobs: "The public interest dictates that if such in-
jury does result from the defective construction, its cost should be borne by the
responsible developer who created the danger and who is in the better economic
position to bear the loss rather than by the injured party who justifiably relied on
the developer's skill and implied representation. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc.,
supra note 55, at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
62. 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
63. Id. at 67, 415 P.2d at 710.
64. id. at 67, 415 P.2d at 710.
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Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 5 also involved an action
to recover damages from the builder-vendor which resulted from water
seeping into the basement. The trial court dismissed the implied warranty
count before taking any evidence. 66 The Supreme Court of South Dakota
reversed the decision and cited Schipper to support its ruling.67 After con-
cluding that an implied warranty of reasonable workmanship and habitabil-
ity, surviving the delivery of the deed, existed in a situation where the ven-
dor of a new house is also the builder, the court went on to answer the
builder-vendor's individual arguments. First, the builder-vendor main-
tained that it was impossible to construct a perfect house. The court an-
swered by stating that perfection was not required; all that was required
was that the house be reasonably free of defects. 8 Applying this test the
vendee could not claim a breach of warranty for a relatively minor defect
and hence the builder-vendor would be protected. Waggoner can be said
to endorse the decision in Bethlahmy in this regard.
Judge Roberts placed a limitation on the duration of the builder-vendor's
liability. He stated that the duration of liability should, as in the case of
defects, be determined by the standard of reasonableness.6 9 This was the
first attempt by a court to set some sort of limitation on the duration of lia-
bility. However, it would probably be more beneficial to the administra-
tion of "justice" for some definite duration of liability to be established,
i.e., a statute of limitations. Granted that some builder-vendors will escape
liability, but many defendants escape liability in personal injury cases be-
cause of the statute of limitations. And if injuries to the body can go un-
remedied for the sake of administrative purposes, certainly no objection can
be raised to applying the same principle to defective property where the
damages usually are purely monetary.
The Texas Supreme Court recognized the implied warranty theory as ap-
plied to the sale of new homes in Humber v. Morton.70 Plaintiff pur-
chased a new home from the builder-vendor; the first time she used the
fireplace, the house caught fire and partially burned. The court based its
decision on the reasoning employed in Carpenter, Schipper and Waggoner.
In dispensing with the caveat emptor, Justice Norwell stated:
The decisions and legal writings . . . referred to afford numerous examples and
situations illustrating the harshness and injustice of the rule when applied to the
65. 83 S. Dak. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
66. Id. at 59, 154 N.W.2d at 804.
67. Id. at 68, 154 N.W.2d at 808.
68. Id. at 68, 154 N.W.2d at 808.
69. Id. at 68, 154 N.W.2d at 808.
70. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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sale of new houses by a builder vendor ..... .The common law is not afflicted
with the rigidity of the law of the Medes and Persians .... 71
Therefore, the Texas court, after running through precedent, as did the
other courts applying the implied warranty, seems to base its decision on
the "justice" of applying the warranty. "Justice" and little else is what the
court in Carpenter based its decision on, and it seems little has changed
since 1964. Justice Norwell had strong feelings about applying caveat
emptor to the sale of real property as evidenced by his words:
The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of
harmony with modem home buying practices. It does a disservice not only to the
ordinary prudent purchaser but to the industry itself by lending encouragement to
the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of shoddy work.
7 2
Obviously the builder-vendor did not feel that Justice Norwell had his best
interests at heart in holding the way he did!
In Crawley v. Terhune,73 the most recent "soggy-basement" decision, the
court did not even bother going through the ritual of reciting precedent,
but simply stated "the caveat emptor rule [as to the sale of a completed
house] is completely unrealistic and inequitable, ' 74 and decided for the
vendee.
The Supreme Court of Washington in House v. Thornton,75 held the
implied warranty of habitability applicable to the sale of new homes. A
short time after plaintiff-vendee purchased the house from defendant-ven-
dor, the foundation slipped and caused cracks to occur throughout the
house. 7 6 The plaintiff based his original claim on fraud and the trial court
returned a verdict in his favor. 7 7 The Supreme Court found an absence of
fraud, but sustained the trial court, basing its decision on the implied war-
71. Id. at 561.
72. Id. at 562. Professor Jaeger takes a similar position in 7 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTs §§ 926m, 926 A (3rd ed. 1963). Professor Jaeger points out that although
the doctrine of caveat emptor is still broadly applied in the realty field, some
courts have inclined towards making an exception in the sale of new Housing where
the vendor is also the developer or contractor, since in such a situation the pur-
chaser relies on the implied representation that the contractor does possess a
reasonable amount of skill necessary for the erection of a house, and that the house
will be fit for human dwelling. In concluding his discussion of the subject, Pro-
fessor Jaeger stated that he felt it would be much better if this enlightened approach
were generally adopted with respect to the sale of new houses for it would tend to
discourage much of the sloppy work that has become apparent over the years.
73. 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969).
74. Supra note 73, at 745.
75. 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1970).
76. Id. at 430, 457 P.2d at 200.
77. Id. at 431, 457 P.2d at 201.
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ranty of habitability. 78 The court found that the warranty was breached
despite the fact that:
[T]here was no proof that the defendants failed to properly design and erect the
building, or that they used defective materials or in any respect did an unwork-
manlike job, and that they were innocent of any intentional wrong, the fact re-
mains that they sold and turned over to plaintiffs a brand-new $32,000 residence
which turned out to be unfit for occupancy.79
The court reasoned the vendor to be liable because he made the harm pos-
sible. The decision was reached by applying a comparative innocence
standard; in the court's words, "the defendants who built and sold the house
were less innocent and more culpable than the wholly innocent and unsus-
pecting buyer."80  The decision in House goes further than any other de-
cision in establishing a stringent standard of conduct for measuring the ven-
dor's performance, a standard of strict liability. The vendor-builder, un-
der the decision in House, is unable to assert the defense that his construc-
tion was workmanlike or that the materials he used were not defective; if
the house is uninhabitable he is liable for breach of the implied warranty.
The Washington Supreme Court did, however, place one important lim-
itation on the application of the implied warranty. As you will recall, the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Schipper allowed a lessee of the vendee to
maintain an action for breach of the implied warranty against the vendor,
despite the absence of privity. The Washington Supreme Court stated
in House that an action for breach of the implied warranty can only be
maintained by the initial vendee.81 Hence, the court adheres to the require-
ment of privity. The requirement can be justified by the fact that the
builder-vendor has no control over future sales by the initial or future ven-
dees. However, considering the abandonment of privity in the products
liability field, one wonders how long this limitation will stand.
The cases which allowed the implied warranty of fitness and habita-
bility to be applied to the sale of real property can be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) The decisions all emphasize the "injustice" of applying caveat
emptor and the inequality of bargaining position between the builder-ven-
dor and the vendee; (2) the warranty applies to substantial defects, those
which render the property uninhabitable, and will not be applied to
remedy minor defects-the test is one of reasonableness; (3) a determina-
tion as to the duration of the liability the builder-vendor has not been
78. Id. at 435-36, 457 P.2d at 203.
79. Id. at 435, 457 P.2d at 203-04.
80. Id. at 436, 457 P.2d at 204.
81. Id. at 436, 457 P.2d at 204. See Wamak v. Stewart, - Ark. -, 449 S.W.2d
922 (1970), were the court also limited the application of the warranty to the initial
purchaser.
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established, although one court proposes that a standard of reasonableness
be imposed; (4) a split has developed as to whether the warranty extends
to subsequent occupants beyond the original vendee; (5) at least one court
holds the vendee to a strict liability standard of conduct.
The trend today is clearly towards placing limitations on the application
of caveat emptor to the sale of real property.8 2 As courts are faced with
situations in which they feel that "justice" requires them to refuse to al-
low the defense of caveat emptor to be asserted, they can rely on an ever-
expanding line of precedent to support their decision. This undoubtedly
will make it easier for them to reach the "desired" results. Indications are
that it is merely a matter of time before the exceptions to caveat emptor, as
applied to sale of real property, swallow the rule.
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY THEORY AS APPLIED
TO THE LEASING OF REAL PROPERTY
Caveat emptor is a favorite defense of the lessor when sued for rescission
or cancellation of a lease on the basis that the premises are uninhabitable.
The majority of American jurisdictions hold that there is no implied war-
ranty that the premises, at the time the term commences, are in a tenant-
able condition or that they are adapted to the purpose for which they are
leased.8 3 The rationale behind this position is that the prospective tenant
may inspect the premises and determine for himself their suitability, or he
may secure an express warranty.
82. See Rothberg v. Olinik, - Vt. -, 262 A.2d 461 (1970), as an indication
of how anxious courts are to extend the warranty. The case before the court
dealt with the sale of a uncompleted house, the court stated, "[ajlthough the
contract of sale in this case was entered into before completion of the house, we
find no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a sale of a newly con-
structed house by the builder-vendor .... ." Id. at -, 262 A.2d at 467. See gen-
erally Hadkell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop-
erty, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor as Applied to
Both the Leasing and Sale of Real Property: The Need for Reappraisal and Reform,
2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 120 (1970).
83. See Parris v. Sinclair Refining Co., 359 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1966); Oliver
v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 280 S.W. 979 (1926); Martin v. Grant, 90 Colo. 300, 8
P.2d 764 (1932); Cox v. Walter M. Lowney Co. of Ga., 35 Ga. App. 51, 132 S.E. 257
(1926); Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 44, 195 N.E.2d 1
(1963); Anderson Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110
N.E.2d 506 (1953); Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 204 N.E.2d 448 (1965);
Causey v. Norwood, 170 Miss. 874, 156 So. 592 (1934); Shaw v. Butterworth,
327 Mo. 622, 38 S.W.2d 57 (1931); Gellis v. Claremount Masonic Ass'n., 85 N.H.
416, 159 A. 295 (1932); Widmar v. Healey, 247 N.Y. 94, 159 N.E. 874 (1928);
Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957); Stein v. Bell
Telephone Co. of Pa., 301 Pa. 107, 151 A. 690 (1930); Corcione v. Riggier, 87
R.I. 182, 139 A.2d 388 (1958); Mallard v. Duke, 131 S.C. 175, 126 S.E. 525 (1925);
Teglo v. Porter, 65 Wash. 2d 772, 399 P.2d 519 (1965).
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As in the sale of real property, exceptions to the application of caveat
emptor developed in leasing situations. The initial exceptions to the ap-
plication of caveat emptor was enunciated in the English case of Smith v.
Marrable.8 4  Smith agreed to lease a furnished house to Marrable for a
five week period. Marrable soon discovered the house to be infested with
bugs. Marrable registered a complaint with Smith, who dispatched an ex-
terminator to remedy the situation, but the exterminator's efforts proved
unsuccessful 8 5 Marrable abandoned the premises and Smith sued for the
rent he maintained was due. The court held that where the lessor rents a
furnished house, he impliedly warrants that the house is in a fit state to be
inhabited.8 6 It is important to note that the court in Smith did not place
any limitation on its holding as to the length of the lease; the Smith court
apparently would find the implied warranty to exist no matter how long
the lease ran.
The position taken by the court in Smith v. Marrable came under im-
mediate attack from two cases decided in the same year: Sutton v. Tem-
ple8 7 and Hart v. Windsor. 8 In Sutton an estate of grazing land was
leased for a period of seven months. A number of cattle grazing on the
land were poisoned by a paint which had accidentally been spread over
the field without the lessor's knowledge. 89  The lessee refused to pay the
rent and the lessor sued. In rejecting the lessee's defense of an implied
warranty of fitness for the purpose for which it was leased, the court
stated:
[T]here is no implied warranty, on a demise of land, that it shall be fit for the
particular purpose for which it is hired. No authority is to be found for such a
proposition and it cannot be supported on principle. A contract for the demise of
land, or of the vesture of land carries with it no further engagement on the
part of the lessor, than that the lessee shall have quiet possession of the estate
granted during the term: there is no undertaking that the land is of any particular
quality or value, or fit for any particular purpose. The whole amount of the
covenant or agreement is, that the lessee shall enjoy the estate, whatever be,
during the term. 90
The court went on to distinguish Smith v. Marrable by saying that there
the lease contemplated a use by Marrable not only of the realty, but also
of the personalty, that is, the furniture. 91  Therefore, reasoned the court,
84. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
85. Id. at 693.
86. Id. at 694.
87. 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843).
88. 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843).
89. Supra note 87, at 1109.
90. Supra note 87, at 1109.
91. Supra note 87, at 1112.
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since this case dealt with land and involved no personalty, the exception
formulated in Smith v. Marrable did not apply.
In Hart v. Windsor,92 the court was presented with a factual situation
quite similar to that in Smith. Plaintiff leased a furnished house with an
adjoining garden to defendant. Just as in Smith the defendant was forced to
leave the house because it was infested with bugs. The lone distinguish-
ing fact was that the lease in Hart was for a three year period. The court
reasoned to the conclusion that the exception to the application of caveat
emptor enunciated in Smith was limited to a situation where a dwelling
is rented for a short and definite time period.93 Since the period of the
lease was three years in Hart, the exception did not apply. In fact, the
court in Hart favored doing away with the implied warranty theory rather
than merely limiting its application. In the court's words:
It is much better to leave the parties in every case to protect their interests them-
selves, by proper stipulations, and if they really mean a lease to be void by reason
of any unfitness in the subject for the purpose intended, they should express that
meaning. 94
Hence, consistent with the rationale behind the application of the doctrine
of caveat emptor the court deemed the parties to be in an equal bargaining
position, and, therefore, if the defendant wanted a warranty he should have
demanded one!
Despite the attack levelled on the exception by Sutton and Hart, it is
now accepted in England as law. As stated in Collins v. Hopkins:95
Not only is the implied warranty on the letting of a furnished house one which
• . . springs by just and necessary implication from the contract, but is a warranty
which tends in the most striking fashion to the public good and the preservation
of public health. It is a warranty to be extended rather than restricted. 96
The English exception has won acceptance in a number of American juris-
dictions. 97
92. Supra note 88.
93. Supra note 88, at 1122.
94. Supra note 88, at 1122.
95. [1923] 2 K.B. 617,34 A.L.R. 703.
96. Id. at 705.
97. This exception is narrowly construed in the United States. Legere v. As-
selta, 342 Mass. 178, 172 N.E.2d 685 (1961). The court in Legere states: "The
implied condition is based upon the inference that the lessee intends immediately
to occupy the premises as they stand. Moreover, the condition is implied only with
regard to the state of the premises at the beginning of the tenancy and does not
cover defects which arise later. . . . The house was fit for habitation when the
[lessee] took possession. That is the extent of warranty." Id. at 179, 172 N.E.2d
at 686. See also Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947);
Hopkins v. Murphy, 233 Mass. 476, 124 N.E. 252 (1919); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 56
Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). But see Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320 (D.C.
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A second exception to the general rule arises when the agreement to
lease is made before the construction of the premises is completed. The
court, in J. D. Young Corporation v. Mc Clintic,98 found that it was im-
pliedly warranted that a building would be suitable for the purposes for
which it had been leased if progress in its construction had not reached the
point at which inspection was possible at the time of the signing of the
rental agreement. 99 This exception has won approval as the majority
rule.100 The underlying rationale behind this exception is the same as
that underlying the distinction made between a completed and uncom-
pleted home when applying the implied warranty of habitability in the sale
of real property. The courts are of the opinion that where the lease is
entered into prior to completion of construction the lessee has little or no
opportunity to inspect the premises. Quare, whether the lessee has any
greater opportunity to inspect the property after construction is com-
pleted? Can the lessee determine whether the basement is waterproof or
whether the roof leaks unless he happens to inspect on a rainy day? Does
the lessee have the expertise to detect rotten timber or a poor foundation?
The lessee's presumed ability to inspect is a "legal fiction" in the true sense
of the phrase.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion,'01 was not satisfied
with the then existing exceptions and decided that the time was proper for
further limitations to be placed on the application of caveat emptor. The
plaintiffs leased a furnished house from defendant. Prior to leasing the
house, plaintiffs inspected it and found it to be in a filthy condition. At the
trial the plaintiffs testified that the defendant stated he would clean and
fix the house prior to the time plaintiffs were to take possession. How-
ever, this was not to be done until after defendant received a signed lease
and deposit. When the plaintiffs did take possession the same conditions
existed that were present at the time of the inspection. The plaintiffs at-
tempted to repair and clean the house themselves, but the task proved in-
surmountable. It was also discovered that the house contained numerous
Cir. 1952), were Mr. Justice Bazelon in his dissent had the following to say about
limiting liability to defects at the commencement of the term: "I think that
rule is an anachronism which has lived on through stare decisis alone rather than
through pragmatic adjustment to the 'felt necessities of [our] time.' I would
therefore discard it and cast the presumptive burden of liability on the landlord.
This, I think, is the command of the realities and mores of our day." Id. at 325.
98. 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676
(Tex. Com. App. 1933).
99. Id. at 461.
100. See Hyland v. Parkside Ins. Co., 7 N.J. Misc. 1123, 162 A. 521 (1932).
101. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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building code violations. Plaintiffs abandoned the premises under what
they alleged was a statutory right in this type of situation.10 2
The Chief Justice rejected the argument that there was a statutory right
to surrender,103 but found the defendant in breach of the implied warranty
of habitability in the lease. In dismissing defendant's defense of caveat
emptor the Chief Justice stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in
our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing
standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this
era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious
legal clich6 caveat emptor.104
Hence, in Wisconsin at least, caveat emptor is no more than an "obnoxious
legal clich6." Pines v. Perrsion has therefore added the argument of social
policy to the arsenal of the lessee's weapons to be used in combating the
defense of caveat emptor. The court reasoned that if it were to allow the
defense of caveat emptor to prevail in this situation, it would allow land-
lords to rent tumble-down houses, which, in the court's words, is a "contrib-
uting cause of such problems as urban blight [whatever that may be],
juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for conscientious landown-
ers."' 0 5 The court, however, applies a non-sequential reasoning process.
It is one thing to maintain that the legislature, through the enactment of
building codes and health regulations, has requested landlords to fulfill
certain duties in order to protect the health and safety of the lessees, and
quite something else to jump from that to the conclusion that these duties
necessarily create others-implied warranties in leasing transactions. Pines
did indeed leave some logical gaps to be filled in by subsequent decisions.
In Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper,'06 the lease involved commercial
office space. The leased premises had an undesirable propensity to flood
when it rained. The plaintiff registered a complaint with the landlord, but
to no avail. At trial the landlord asserted that "obnoxious legal clich6," ca-
veat emptor, as his defense. The court found the defects to be latent, and
102. The plaintiffs relied on Wis. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 234.17 (1957), which
provides: "Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so
injured by the elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for
occupancy, and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing,
the lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault
or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the land
so leased or occupied, and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner, rent for
the time subsequent to the surrender."
103. Supra note 101, at 594, 111 N.W.2d at 412.
104. Supra note 101, at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-3.
105. Supra note 101, at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
106. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
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that these defects were unknown to the lessee when the agreement to rent
was consummated. The landlord, according to script, vigoriously con-
tested the existence of any implied warranty of fitness. 10 7
Justice Francis, writing for the court, conceded that historically no im-
plied warranty had been imposed on the lessor, and that in the absence of
an express warranty the lessee takes the property as he finds it.108 It was
his contention that the lessor is in a better position than the lessee to judge
the condition of the premises, and any latent defects therein. In support
of this contention he cited the fact that the penalties for violations of
modern building code requirements are directed at the landlord and not the
lessee. It only stands to reason that the prospective lessee of commercial
property cannot be expected to know whether the building meets code re-
quirements, nor should the lessee be required to hire experts to advise him
of any defects in the building not readily detectable to the intelligent lay-
man.109
In the court's opinion the lessor, who is more informed about the build-
ing's characteristics, should bear the risk that it might not turn out to be
suitable for the purpose for which it was rented. The lessor knows the
premises and the use to which they are to be put. Therefore, the risk of
eventual unsuitability should be borne by him. Likewise, when the prem-
ises are leased for habitation and they prove to be uninhabitable the lessor
should bear the risk.
The decision in Reste is on firmer grounds than the social policy argu-
ments advanced in Pines-the grounds being the lessor's knowledge of the
building he proposes to lease. The lessor, knowing more about the risks
involved, is the party to assume the burden of liability if these risks turn
out to be actual rather than potential. The immediate result of the appli-
cation of this theory is the protection of the lessee from added financial
burdens. This argument supports the court's conclusion that "present day
demands of fair treatment for tenants with respect to latent defects remedi-
able by the landlord. . . require imposition on him of an implied warranty
against such defects. . . ."11 The holding in Reste specifically overruled
prior New Jersey decisions,"' and extended the implied warranty theory to
commercial leases.
107. Id. at 451, 251 A.2d at 271.
108. Id. at 451, 251 A.2d at 272.
109. Id. at 451-52, 251 A.2d at 272.
110. Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273.
111. See Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415(App. Div. 1967), cert. denied, 51 N.J. 276, 239 A.2d 664 (1968), in which the
court declared that isolated lease or sales transactions should continue to be gov-
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In Marini v. Ireland,112 the New Jersey court extended the application of
the implied warranty theory to residential leases. The lessee, after taking
possession, discovered that the toilet was cracked and water was leaking
onto the bathroom floor. After repeated complaints the lessee engaged a
plumber to remedy the situation. The lessee presented the bill for repair
to the lessor, who promptly refused to reimburse the lessee. The lessee
then proceeded to deduct the cost of the repairs from his rent payments.
The court, after extensively quoting from Pines and Reste, stated that
the lease expressly described the premises as "4 rooms and bath, apartment"
and restricted the use thereof for one purpose-"dwelling."' The court
held that the effect of this description was an agreement that the premises
were habitable and fit for living. 114 The court went on to reason that since
the very purpose of the rental was to furnish the defendant with quarters
suitable for living purposes, "[iut is eminently fair and just to charge a land-
lord with the duty of warranting. . . that a building or part thereof rented
for residential purposes is fit for that purpose at the inception of the term
and will remain so during the entire term." 115  Ancillary to such a war-
ranty, the court went on to hold, the landlord agrees to repair damage to
vital facilities caused by ordinary wear and tear during the term."1 6 The
court held that the nature of vital facilities and the extent and type of main-
tenance and repair required is limited and governed by the amount of rent
reserved.1 17 Hence, Marini not only extended the implied warranty to res-
idential leases in New Jersey, but also implied an agreement that the land-
lord was to repair defects to vital facilities [i.e., a toilet] which arose after
the execution of the lease; this is contrary to the majority of decisions
which have held that the implied warranty would only extend to defects
in existence at the execution of the lease."18
erned by the traditional rule that there is no implied warranty that the premises
are fit for the purposes specified. See also La Freda v. Woodward, 125 N.J. 489,
15 A.2d 798 (1940), which held that the doctrine of covenants implied in leas-
ing property has been strictly construed in New Jersey and that caveat emptor gen-
erally applied.
112. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). See generally Skillem, Implied War-
ranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L. REV. 387, 394 (1966);
Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37
MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953).
113. Marini v. Ireland, supra note 112, at 144, 265 A.2d at 533.
114. Marini v. Ireland, supra note 112, at 144, 265 A.2d at 533.
115. Marini v. Ireland, supra note 112, at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
116. Marini v. Ireland, supra note 112, at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
117. Marini v. Ireland, supra note 112, at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
118. Supra note 97, where this limitation is discussed in connection with one of
the early exceptions to caveat emptor.
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The Supreme Court of Hawaii recognized the implied warranty theory
in Lemle v. Breeden.119 The lessee leased a waterfront house from the
lessor. Prior to the execution of the lease the lessee found no evidence of
rodent infestation during a one-half hour inspection.' 20 The lessee based
its cause of action on an alleged breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility and fitness by the lessor.121 In sustaining the lessee's action the court
stated:
From that contractual relationship an implied warranty of habitability and fitness
for the purposes intended is a just and necessary implication. It is a doctrine which
has its counterparts in the law of sales and torts and one which when candidly
countenanced is impelled by the nature of the transaction and contemporary housing
realities. Legal fictions and artifical exceptions to wooden rules of property law
aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling house, such as in this case, there is
an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for use intended.' 22
The court in Lemle, as did its predecessors, justified the application of the
implied warranty theory on the assumption that present day realities of
leasing transactions require some protection for the lessee.
The majority of the decisions applying the implied warranty of habita-
bility have dealt with the leasing of a house. However, Javers v. First Na-
tional Realty Corporation23 involved the leasing of an apartment.
Through separate written leases each of the lessees rented an apartment in
a three-building complex in Washington, D.C. The lessees withheld their
rent payments because of the existence of an alleged 1500 housing viola-
tions. The lessees contended that the landlord was under a contractual
duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the housing regulations. 124
The lower courts rejected this argument.'12  Circuit Judge Shelly prefaced
his decision by stating:
119. 51 H 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). See Note, Landlord and Tenant-Implied
Warranty of Habitability-How "Constructive" is "Eviction"?, 19 DE PAUL L. REV.
619 (1970).
120. Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 119, at 427, 462 P.2d at 471.
121. Support in California was indicated in Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (App. Dep't., Super. Ct., Los Angeles County
1967), where the court held that the landlord had an obligation to keep the premises
free from vermin. The landlord was held liable under the implied warranty theory,
the court finding that the application of caveat emptor would be inconsistent with
the legislative policy behind housing standards.
122. Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 119, at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.
123. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For cases where the courts denied the
application of the warranty to apartments, see Kearse v. Spaulding, 406 Pa. 140,
176 A.2d 450 (1962); Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.
2d 321 (Civ. Ct., City of N.Y., Trial Term, New York County 1964).
124. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra note 123, at 1073.
125. Sauders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. 1968).
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Courts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of the facts and values
of contemporary life-particularly old common law doctrines which the courts
themselves created and developed.
1 2 6
Reasoning from the premise that leases should be treated as contracts, the
court went on to examine applicable property law and reappraise the appli-
cation of caveat emptor to leasing situations.
The court took into consideration the seller's liability in the sale of chat-
tels, where without any special agreement a merchant will be held to war-
rant that his goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are
used, and that they are at least of reasonably average quality. The court
saw no reason why the same theory should not apply to the leasing of
apartments, and hence found for the lessees. 127
An interesting approach to the problem is taken by the Model Residen-
tial Landlord-Tenant Code. 12s  The adoption of this code would place
duties on the landlord which, taken as a whole, would require him to keep
the premises in an habitable condition. 129  Failure of the landlord to
remedy a defective condition, including defects caused by the lessee or his
family or guests, within seven days after written notification from the lessee,
gives the lessee the immediate right to terminate the lease. 130 The prac-
tical effect of this code would be the elimination of caveat emptor as far as
leases are concerned.
The cases which have allowed the implied warranty to be asserted in
leasing situations, involving real property, can be summarized as follows:
(1) The decisions all express the opinion that the application of caveat
emptor would be inconsistent with public policy as expressed in modern
housing codes; (2) the courts emphasize the stronger bargaining position
of the lessor due to the present housing shortage; (3) the courts also feel
the lessor to be in a superior bargaining position because of his knowledge
of the characteristics of the property; (4) one court has extended the war-
ranty to cover defective vital facilities, including defects which arise after
126. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra note 124, at 1074. See
Spencer v. General Hospital of the District of Columbia, 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55; Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
127. Supra note 15.
128. TENTATIVE DRAFT (1969); see Comment, Proposed Alterations of the
Landlord-Tenant Relationship for the State of Illinois, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 752
(1970).
129. See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, TENTATIVE DRAFT § 2.1
(1969).
130. See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, TENTATIVE DRAFT § 2.3
(1969).
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the execution of the lease; (5) the warranty applies to apartments as well
as houses.
Regardless of the approach taken, whether it be through court decisions
or statutory enactment, the trend today is away from the application of ca-
veat emptor in the leasing of real property.
CONCLUSION
The arguments advanced by the proponents and opponents of caveat
emptor in both the sale and leasing situations are basically the same. The
most frequent argument put forth for the continued application of caveat
emptor is that if the doctrine were abandoned an element of uncertainty
would pervade the entire real estate field. The proponents of the doctrine
argue that real estate transactions would become chaotic if vendors were
subjected to liability after they had parted with ownership and control of
the premises. The vendors could never be certain as to the limits or ter-
mination of their liability. 131
It can be conceded that some confusion will initially result from the
abandonment of caveat emptor and the application of the implied warranty.
However, the confusion that will arise because of the application of the im-
plied warranty will not be of such magnitude as to justify the continued ex-
emption of the vendor from liability for defective construction work. As
to chaos resulting from the abandonment of caveat emptor, one need only
look to the fields of personal property sales and leasing to reach the con-
clusion that the abandonment of caveat emptor does not necessarily re-
sult in chaotic conditions. As stated by the court in Schipper,13 2 in an-
swering the defendant's "chaos argument," "we fail to see why this should
be anticipated or why it should materialize any more than in the products
liability field where there has been no such result.' 133
Another frequent argument advanced in support of the continued ap-
plication of caveat emptor is that since the parties are dealing at arm's
length, the lessee or vendee has sufficient opportunity to inspect the prop-
erty to discover any defects. This reasoning is invalid for two reasons.
First, the implied warranty is applied in order to protect the vendee or
lessee from latent defects, defects which are not discoverable by ordinary
inspection. Therefore, caveat emptor would continue to govern situations
involving patent defects.
131. Levy v. C. Young Const. Co., supra note 55, provides an example of the
type of case where the argument met with success.
132. Supra note 55.
133. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., supra note 55, at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
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Secondly, this line of reasoning brings into focus the strongest argument
in favor of application of the implied warranty, that of reliance. The vast
majority of vendees or lessees do not have the expertise necessary to in-
spect the property in question. They are in effect given no choice but to
rely heavily on the greater skill and knowledge of the vendor or lessor. No
matter how diligently a prudent layman may attempt to discover possible
latent defects, his efforts will rarely meet with success, for by definition,
these defects are not readily discoverable. In order to meet with any type
of success the vendee or lessee would have to seek and pay for expert ad-
vice. Few people, considering the cost of purchasing or renting today,
could afford these additional expenses. It appears far less unreasonable
to attribute knowledge of the defects to the owner of the property, for it is
he who stands to profit and not the prospective vendee or lessee.
The argument that the transaction is at arm's length is also used to sup-
port the contention of the vendor or lessor that if the vendee or lessee had
wanted protection against latent or other defects he could have obtained an
express warranty. Even conceding the fact that when the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor developed the parties were in an equal bargaining position and
could readily be expected to protect themselves in the deed or lease with an
express warranty, that situation does not exist today. Despite the vast
amount of building that has taken place in this country since World War
II, supply has not been able to keep up with demand. Vendees or lessees
are no more able to protect themselves in the deed or lease than the pur-
chaser of an automobile is through a bill of sale. One need only examine
the dilemma of the low income urban dweller to realize that the situation
created by the present levels of supply and demand strongly favor the party
seeking to sell or lease over the party seeking to buy or rent.
Caveat emptor, argues the vendor or lessor, is justified because the in-
dividuals who buy or lease the property do not know how to properly care
for it. Moreover, real estate is constantly exposed to the elements of na-
ture and hence it should be treated differently from other property for lia-
bility purposes. It is not contested that defects may be brought about by
the vendee's or lessee's improper care of the property, or by the elements;
however, the implied warranty would not be applicable to these situations.
The protection afforded by the implied warranty extends only to defects
caused by improper construction by the vendor and improper maintenance
by the lessor; hence, this argument is tenuous at best.
The proponents of caveat emptor further contend that an implied war-
ranty is unnecessary because, in their opinion, vendors and lessors moti-
vated by personal pride and the need to preserve their good reputation will
themselves repair defects in the property. One need only look at the num-
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ber of law suits filed in this area to reach the conclusion that the preserva-
tion of pride and good reputation are poor substitutes for legal sanctions.
Vendors and lessors also raise the argument that the imposition of a war-
ranty would make them virtual insurers of all who thereafter come upon
the premises. This argument is faulty, for the plaintiff would still have
the burden of showing the existence of the defect and would have to prove
causation as to any damages alleged.
The proponents of caveat emptor next contend that if an implied war-
ranty be imposed in real property dealings, it would be necessary for the
vendor or lessor to have adequate insurance coverage. The cost of this
insurance, it is contended, would be very high, since the insured might be
held liable for repairing buildings over which he no longer has any control.
Undoubtedly, the cost of this insurance would be passed on to the buyer or
lessee and the cost of housing would rise commensurately. This is one of
the strongest arguments in favor of the continued application of caveat
emptor. However, in the long run, the cost of insurance may force the
vendor or lessor to be more "workmanlike." As a result of being more
"workmanlike," houses will contain fewer defects and the reduction of de-
fects will result in fewer claims, which in turn will result in lower insurance
premiums. Even if the insurance costs remain high it seems to be a more
"just" solution than that of having the entire burden placed on the vendee
or lessee.
The proponents of caveat emptor predict that if an implied warranty
were recognized a rash of litigation would follow. This argument must be
rejected even if it be true, for if "just" claims cannot be remedied in a court
of law, where can they be remedied? The satisfaction of "just" claims
must take precedence over the desire to have uncrowded court dockets.
A builder of a house can be compared to a manufacturer of a product.
The builder-vendor puts together the house from various components, as
does the manufacturer of a product. Since the construction process is sim-
iliar in both instances, it only seems logical that the warranty protection
offered in both instances should be the same. Likewise, the lessor holds
out the premises which he intends to lease as being fit for the purposes for
which the lessee intends to use them. The manufacturer of a product
holds out his product as being fit for the purpose the purchaser intends to
use it. The warranty protection should be equal in both instances.
When the real property is sold or leased a warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose should attach, provided the vendee or lessee makes the intended
use known and relies on the vendor's or lessor's skill and knowledge con-
cerning the property.
The building boom which followed World War II resulted in radical
changes in the American building industry. The builder who emerged from
this boom was no longer the craftsman who predominated when the doc-
trine of caveat emptor was formulated. The American builder has become
a mass producer. The mass production techniques which have been uti-
lized have resulted in shoddy construction, due to haste and skimping on
materials. This situation has not only had a bad effect on the vendee of
real property, but also on the lessee of the property constructed in such a
manner. Whereas caveat emptor at one time may have worked fairly well
in an era when housing was built with care, it has now been rendered ob-
solete due to shoddy construction and the housing shortage. Stated
simply, "[t]he morals of the market place . . . are now opposed to a
caveat emptor philosophy."'1 4
Chet Maciorowski
134. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the
Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 574 (1961).
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